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Article 3

The Uniform Probate Code and
Illinois Probate Practice
GLENN R. DRURY*
The high cost of dying is not the funeral: it's the legal and administrative costs of getting the dead man's estate . . . through the
the probate or surrogatecourts.'
In most areas of this country the probate procedure is a
scandal, a form of tribute levied by the 2legal profession upon the
estates of its victims, both living and dead.
These remarks, perhaps most significant because they were made
by laymen and not by lawyers, reflect an increasing public concern
with the delay and expense involved in the process of passing a decedent's estate to his heirs and legatees.'
The American system of
probate has been described as antiquated, corrupt and hopelessly
complex. It is viewed by many as being little more than a device
for tying up an estate as long as possible so that more of it may be
given to the lawyers and less to the beneficiaries.
Criticisms such as these are inspired by probate laws that are
often hopelessly out of date. They are aggravated by all too frequent instances of greed and incompetence in the administration of
estates. A large part of the probate problem, however, results from
the fact that the American probate "system" is in fact 50 different
systems. It is tempting to believe that this diversity has resulted
from the specialized application of a general law that was carefully
* Associate, Kirkland & Ellis, Chicago, Illinois. A.B., 1967, Wheaton College;
J.D., 1974, Northwestern University Law School.
1. Bloom, The Mess in Our Probate Courts, READER'S Dionsr, Oct. 1966, at 102.
2. N. DACEY, How TO Avoix PROBATE! 7 (1965).
3. See generally Bloom, Time to Clean up Our Probate Courts, READER'S DIGEST,
Jan. 1970, at 112; Let's Rewrite The Probate Laws, CHANGING TIMES, Jan. 1969, at 39;
Myers, Probing the Source of Our Probate Pains,The Wall Street Journal, May 14, 1968,
at 18, col. 3; Morgan, The Probate Fuss, LooK. Nov. 29, 1966, at 36.
4. Wellman, The Uniform Probate Code: Blueprint for Reform in the 70's, 2
CoN . L. REV. 453, 458 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Wellman]. The only exception
is the State of Louisiana which derives its probate system from the French civil law.
See L.S.A. CIv. CODE (Rev. 1950) art. 1013.
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tailored to meet problems peculiar to the areas in which it was adopted.
Such flexibility is the beauty of a federal form of government. But
an examination of the ways in which the various codes were actually
brought into existence indicates that this was not the case. All but
one of the states derive their probate systems from the English model 5
which, while far from ideal, at least had the advantages of uniformity. But in drafting their various codes, the states have engrafted numerous exceptions and additions onto the basic English system, and
this multiplicity of systems has caused no end of problems for the
lawyer trying to handle the estates of an increasingly mobile clientele.
In 1948, after making a detailed study of the history of American probate laws, Professor Simes concluded that:
[M]ost variations in this legislation are 'the result of historical accident. When a given statute was drafted, the legislative committee happened to borrow from the statutes of Massachusetts or
Virginia or New York or California because a copy of the revised
statutes of that state was available to members of the committee.
No one will ever know how much the excellent printing and book
binding which went into the edition of the Massachusetts Revised
Statutes of 1836 had to do with the adoption of those statutes
in other states. . . . I think the probate statute is rare indeed
which may be said to be peculiarly adapted
to the social condi6
tions of one state but not to those in another.
Professor Wellman, on the other hand, attributes the diversity less
to aesthetics than to cupidity. "The variety," he concludes,
demonstrates that the dominant factor in growth of our probate
institution has been the preoccupation of our legislative and legal
community with the power represented by assets of decedents.
The story of probate is a story of expansion and dispersal
of
7
this power among local politicians and the legal profession.
Regardless of the reasons for their complexities, the procedures used
for the administration and distribution of decedents' estates may be
said to be uniform in only two significant respects; they are almost
invariably lengthy and expensive.'
In spite of this, or perhaps because of it, probate reform has been a long time in coming.
When the American Bar Association was formed in 1878, one of
5. Wellman, supra note 4, at 455-59.
6. Simes, Improving Probate Procedure, 87 TRuSrS & ESTATES, 277, 281-82 (1948)
[hereinafter cited as Simes].
7. Wellman, supra note 4, at 458.
8. Writing in 1948, Professor Simes noted that: "There is... a core of uniformity
in our probate legislation. But, to one who studies it in detail, it is like some of the
lurid advertisements of improved varieties of apples-the core is very small." Simes,
supra note 7, at 277.
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its primary objectives was to promote the uniformity of state legislation.' At its first annual meeting in 1879, the Association approved
a resolution in favor of uniform legislation governing the execution
and attestation of wills. 10 In 1886, the Association's Committee
on Jurisprudence and Law Reform reported on the Uniformity of Proceedings in the Settlement of Estates of Decedents who have left Property in Several States. 1 In 1891, the Committee on Uniform State
Laws reported its virtually unanimous support for greater uniformity
of legislation in the areas of descent, distribution, wills and probate. 2
In spite of these early expressions of support, it was not until 1922
that the first, halting efforts were made to achieve uniformity in probate related areas. In that year, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL) promulgated its Uniform
Fiduciaries Act. The Act was designed to govern the activities of all
fiduciaries, including executors and administrators, in the administration
of wills.' 3 Nothing was done in the way of large scale reform, however, until Professor Thomas Atkinson, in a series of articles written
in 1939 and 1940,"' once again drew the attention of the legal community to the need for probate reform.
As a result of these articles, the Real Property, Probate and Trust
Law Division of the American Bar Association appointed a committee to study Professor Atkinson's proposals.15 In 1946, under the leadership of Professor Simes, the A.B.A.'s subcommittee on drafting published a book entitled Problems in Probate Law' 6 that included a
Model Probate Code. Substantial parts of this model code were
9. Id. at 282.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Uniform FiduciariesAct (1922). Since then, the National Conference has also
promulgated the following probate related legislation: Uniform Veteran's Guardianship
Act; Uniform Principal and Income Act; Uniform Simultaneous Death Act; Uniform
Interstate Arbitration and Compromise of Death Taxes Acts; Uniform Ancillary Ad.
ministration of Estates Act; Uniform Probate of Foreign Wills Act; Model Small Estates
Act; Uniform Gifts to Minors Act; Uniform Estate Tax Apportionment Act; Uniform
Simplification of Fiduciary Security Transfers Act; Uniform Testamentary Additions to
Trusts Act; Uniform Trustees' Powers Act; Uniform Anatomical Gift Act; and the Uniform Probate Code. The Conference has also recommended legislation in the areas of
absentees' property, estate administration, trust administration, execution of wills, cy
pres, powers of foreign representatives and death tax credits. See HANDBOOK OF THE
NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAws 421-25 (1973).
14. E.g., Atkinson, Wanted-A Model Probate Code, 23 J. AM. JUD. Soc'Y 183
(1940).
15. See Fratcher & Straus, Model Probate Code, 35 PA. BAR Assoc. Q. 206, 208
(1964) [hereinafter cited as Fratcher & Straus].
16. L. SIMES & P. BASYE, PROBLEMS IN PROBATE LAW INCLUDING A MODEL PROBATE
CODE (1946).
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adopted in 11 states, 1 7 and it may have influenced the adoption of
probate legislation in others."8 The response, while encouraging, was
still considerably less than might have been desired, and in 1961 and
1962, the American Bar Association and the NCCUSL commissioned
a joint committee to restudy the 1946 Act and to develop a Uniform
Probate Code. 19
The committee's task was to draft a probate code that would have
the advantages of uniformity and would cut down on the time and
expense involved in probate and administration. In 1966, the joint
committee's subcommittee on drafting produced its first tentative
draft consisting of five sections, each of which constituted a revision
of a similar section in the Model Probate Code. This first draft included a general article, an article on intestate succession and wills,
an article on the probate and administration of estates, an article on
guardians and conservatorships and an article on foreign personal
representatives and ancillary administration.2" Between 1966 and
1969, four more drafts were produced and considered. The Official
Text was finally adopted by the NCCUSL and by the House of Delegates
of the A.B.A. during the summer of 1969.21
In its final form, the Uniform Probate Code contains, in addition
to the five articles in the first tentative draft, an article on non-probate transfers and an article on trust administration. 2 The "heart of
the Code," however, is article II12 that deals with the probate of
wills and the administration of decedents' estates. Article III introduces
the concepts of informal probate and unsupervised administration. It
is these provisions that have caused much of the controversy that has
surrounded the Code since its promulgation in 1969.24
To date, the Uniform Probate Code has been adopted, in one form
or another, in eight states25 and has been proposed for adoption in
17.

Arkansas, California, Colorado, Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Missouri,

North Carolina, Oregon and Texas.
18. E.g., Pennsylvania. id.

19.

See Fratcher & Straus, supra note 15, at 208.

See Fratcher, Toward Uniform Succession Legislation, 41 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1037,

1039 (1966).

20.

Id. at 1040-41.

21.

55 A.B.A.J. 976 (1969).

22. UNIFORM PROBATE CODE, Official Text (West ed. 1970) [hereinafter cited as
U.P.C.].
23. U.P.C. art. I1, General Comment at 74.
24. See, e.g., Mr. Zartman's critical analysis of article III in Zartman, An Illinois
Critique of the Uniform Probate Code, 1970 U. ILL. L.F. 413, 471-528 [hereinafter cited

as Zartman]; and Professor Wellman's reply in Wellman, A Reaction to the Chicago
Commentary, 1970 U. ILL. L.F. 536. See also STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA, THE UNIFORM
PROBATE CODE: ANALYSIS AND CRTQUE XX-XXVI, 63-129 (1973).
25. Eight states have adopted the Code more or less in its entirety. These include:
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many others,2 6 including Illinois. 7 In many of these states, one
of the questions that is repeatedly being asked is whether the adoption of the Uniform Probate Code would significantly decrease the
time and expense involved in the probate and administration of
estates and, even if it would, whether it is the most effective means
available for accomplishing that objective. This article reports the
results of a survey of 500 estates probated in the Circuit Court of
Cook County, Illinois, during 1969. The purpose is to determine
whether replacement of the Illinois Probate Act2" with the Uniform
Probate Code would have significantly reduced the time and expense
involved in the administration of those 500 estates.
THE ILLINOIS PROBATE ACT

VS.

THE UNIFORM PROBATE CODE

To evaluate the results of this survey of estates probated in Illinois
it is important to understand the differences between the handling
of estates under the Illinois Probate Act and the system proposed under the Uniform Probate Code.29
Probatingthe Estate
The most obvious difference between the Illinois Probate Act and
the Uniform Probate Code is the need for any sort of probate proceeding at all. In Illinois, probate is required in all estates, testate or
intestate.3" Under the U.P.C., probate may be dispensed with entirely
Alaska, ALASKA STAT. tit. 13 (1972); Arizona, ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14 (1973);
Colorado, COLO. REV. STAT. tit. 15 (1973); Idaho, IDAHO CODE tit. 15 (1971); Montana,
REV. CODE OF MONT. tit. 91A (1974); Nebraska, REV. STAT. NEB. ch. 30 (1974); North
Dakota, N.D. CENT. CODE tit. 30.1 (1973); South Dakota, S.D. LAws ch. 196 (1974).
Maryland, ANN. CODE OF MD. art. on Estates and Trusts, § 1-101 et seq. (1973);
Minnesota, MINN. STAT. ANN. § 524.1-101 et seq. (Supp. 1974); Oregon, ORE. REV.
STAT. § 111.005 et seq. (1974) and Wisconsin, Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 851.21-865.19
(1973) have also enacted probate laws which incorporate or are patterned after parts
of the U.P.C.
26. See generally Joint Editorial Board for the Uniform Probate Code, Interim Status Report, Oct. 1973.
27. H.B. 713 and S.B. 354, 78th Ill. Gen. Assembly (1973).
28. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 3 (1973) [hereinafter cited as I.P.A.I.
29. A detailed analysis of the differences between the Illinois Probate Act and the
Uniform Probate Code can be found in Zartman, supra note 24, at 471-529. In addition, a rather detailed attempt to reconcile the U.P.C. with the Illinois Probate Act and
with the comments in the Zartman critique was made in 1973 by Professor Ronald Link,
then of the Northwestern University School of Law, and is currently on file with the
U.P.C. Joint Subcommittee of the Illinois State and Chicago Bar Associations.
30. I.P.A. section 324 does provide for informal distribution without probate of certain small estates having assets that include no real property and do not exceed a total
value of $5,000. In addition, the standard techniques for transfer without probate, intervivos transfers, trusts, joint ownership and bonding are in general use among Illinois estate planners. See generally CORCORAN, ALTERNATIVES TO PROBATE (ill. Inst. for Cont.
Legal Ed. 1971); Waldman, Small Estates, in ADMINISTERING ILLINOIS ESTATES § 10.5
(Ill. Inst. for Cont. Legal Ed. 1970).
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if the decedent died intestate or if the devisees are in possession of
his property and if no court proceedings are instituted within 3 years
of the decedent's death."'

In Illinois, if probate is required, full proceedings must be instituted. This includes a filing of the will, 2 or in the case of intestacy a petition for issuance of letters of administration, 33 a petition for
probate, 4 notice to the heirs, 5 proof of heirship 36 and a hearing on the
will. 7 These formalities are required regardless of the size of the estate"
or the willingness of all parties to dispense with probate. Under the Uniform Code, if all interested parties consent, the will may be probated
by the filing of a simple application with an administrative official.39
If formal proceedings are used, the Code provides for a single hearing in which the will is proved, heirship is established, and any con-

test is heard and disposed of.40

In Illinois, separate hearings may

be required for proof of heirship and proof of the will,4 ' and a separate hearing is always required whenever there is a contest.4 2 The

process of proving the will itself is also considerably simpler under
43
the Code than it is under the Illinois Probate Act.

31. U.P.C. § 3-101, -102, -108.
32. I.P.A. § 60.
33. I.P.A. H8 95-102. The procedure involves a formal petition and requires notice
to all persons who may have preference in obtaining the letters under section 96.
34. I.P.A. § 62, 63.
35. I.P.A. § 64, 65.
36. I.P.A. 88 57, 58.
37. This may involve the appointment of a guardian ad litem for any minor or incompetent heirs, I.P.A. § 67, and the testimony of at least two witnesses to the execution
of the will, I.P.A. § 69.
38. Unless the estate meets the requirements of the small estate exception of LP.A.
§ 324.
39. U.P.C. § 3-301. The Code provides for a series of options at each stage of the
probate process. "Interested" parties, defined in section 1-201 to include "heirs, devisees, children, spouses, creditors, beneficiaries and any others having a property right
in or claim against . . . the estate," may choose whether and to what extent a court
will become involved in the probate process. If no interested person requests a formal
proceeding and if there is only one known testamentary instrument, then the will may
be informally probated under section 3-304.
In order to informally probate a will an interested person must file an application for
informal probate stating, among other things, his interest in the estate, the names and
addresses of all heirs and devisees, the name and address of any other appointed personal
representative and that the iinstrument presented is, to the best of his knowledge, the
decedent's last will. U.P.C. § 3-301(1), (2). If at least 120 hours have elapsed since
the decedent's death and if the Registrar is satisfied that the will is entitled to be informally probated, he will enter an order of informal probate that is conclusive as to the
validity of the will unless superceded in a formal testacy proceeding. U.P.C. § 3-303.
No notice of an informal probate proceeding need be given unless it has been demanded by an interested person under section 3-204 or unless there is another personal
representative whose appointment has not been revoked. U.P.C. § 3-306.
40. U.P.C. 88 3-401, -404.
41. I.P.A. § 64. This, however, is only infrequently the case.
42. See, e.g., Practice Rule 14.2 of the Circuit Court of Cook County.
43. Compare U.P.C. § 2-504, -505, -506 with I.P.A. § 69.
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Administering the Estate
In Illinois, a personal representative must be appointed to administer all probate estates unless the estate qualifies for summary administration.14 Under the Uniform Probate Code, a personal representative need not be appointed unless the estate is to be administered
or a claim is to be enforced against the estate. 5
Under Illinois law, the personal representative must be appointed
in a formal proceeding with notice to all interested parties." He must
post a bond before assuming his office and his bond must be secured unless surety has been waived by the will.4 7 Under the Code,
if an estate is to be administered, a personal representative may be
appointed in informal, no-notice proceedings 48 or, if formal proceedings are required, he may be appointed at the hearing on proof of the
will. 4 No bond is required of an informal representative unless it is
required by the will or demanded by a substantial creditor; 50 and a
formal representative need not furnish bond if it is waived by the will
and is not demanded by an interested person. 51 In addition, under
the U.P.C., the court may always excuse a representative from furnishing bond, even where it would otherwise be required. "2
In Illinois, the personal representative's primary functions are to
collect the assets of the decedent's estate, to maintain them until they
can be distributed and to determine and pay the decedent's debts
and taxes.5 3 He is under the continuing supervision of the court and,
unless he is given greater powers under the will, he must obtain court
approval before he may sell, lease, mortgage, pledge, exchange or remove estate property,5 4 perform the decedent's contracts, 5 pay certain taxes,5 6 or continue the decedent's business for a period of
more than 1 month.57 He is also significantly restricted in the nature of the investments that he may make with the decedent's prop44.
45.
46.
47.
will.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
(1956).
54.
55.

I.P.A. §§ 75, 95.
U.P.C. § 3-104.
I.P.A. §§ 62-65.
I.P.A. § 151. In practice, however, surety is almost invariably waived in the
U.P.C. § 3-301.
U.P.C. § 3-401.
U.P.C. §§ 3-603(3),-605.
U.P.C. § 3-603.
U.P.C. § 3-603, -604.
See generally 19 ILL. LAW & PRAcTIcE, Executors and Administrators, O§ 2, 5
I.P.A. §§ 209, 215, 217, 221, 222, 222a, 225, 229.
I.P.A. §§ 218, 252.

56.

I.P.A. § 249.

57.

I.P.A. § 213a.
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erty.55 A Code representative, on the other hand, has all of the
powers and liabilities of a trustee and may, without leave of court
and unless otherwise restricted by the will or by an order of supervised administration,5" retain and receive assets on behalf of the estate, perform, compromise or break the decedent's contracts, satisfy
certain charitable pledges, make any investment that is "reasonable
for use by trustees generally," acquire or dispose of estate assets,
abandon valueless property, employ agents and advisors, borrow
money, sell, mortgage or lease the decedent's property, and continue
or even incorporate the decedent's business. 60 In addition, unless supervised administration is specifically requested, the Code representative is not subject to continuous supervision by the court but only
to those court orders that interested persons may find it necessary
to obtain. 6
There are also significant differences under the two systems in
the handling of claims against the estate. The period for filing claims
in Illinois is 6 months6" whereas under the Code, only 4 months are allowed.6" Under the Code, a claim is presented to the personal representative who then decides whether it will be allowed, 6 4 and unless
this determination is challenged in court, it becomes final 60 days
after a notice of disallowance has been mailed.6 5 Once the period for
58. I.P.A. § 259.
59. See U.P.C. § 3-501 to -505. Under the Code, administration is unsupervised
unless the parties elect otherwise. Supervised administration may be requested by any

interested person or by the personal representative "at any time," provided only that it

is preceded or accompanied by a request for formal testacy proceedings, and it will

normally be granted if it is requested by the decedent's will, if it is necessary to protect
the interests of the parties or the estate (even though unsupervised administration may
have been requested in the will), or in other cases where the court feels that it is required.

In spite of the rather detailed treatment given to "supervised administration" by the
Code, the only significant differences between a supervised and an unsupervised administrator are that:
a) a supervised administrator must make a formal distribution of the estate, U.P.C.
§ 3-505; whereas an unsupervised administrator may distribute estate assets without court
approval unless formal closing is required by an interested person, U.P.C. § 3-1001: and
b) a supervised administrator may be restricted ab initio by any limitations included
in his letters, U.P.C. § 3-501, whereas an unsupervised administrator is bound only by

those court orders that are obtained by interested persons during the course of administration. U.P.C. § 3-607.
60. U.P.C. 99 3-711, -715.

The list is by no means complete; it serves only to illus-

trate some of the more significant departures from Illinois law.
61. U.P.C. § 3-607 and art. III, General Comment 7.
62. This 6-month limitation became effective in October, 1972. Prior Illinois law
had allowed a 7-month period for filing claims. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 3, § 204 (1973).
63. " Compare I.P.A. § 204 with U.P.C. § 3-803(a).

There is now very little differ-

ence, however, since the Illinois claim period runs from the date of the issuance of letters, I.P.A. § 194, whereas the Code period runs from the date of first publication, which

may be as late as 3 weeks after appointment. U.P.C. § 3-803(a)(1).
64.

U.P.C. H9 3-804, -806.

65.

U.P.C. § 3-804.
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filing of claims has expired, all allowed claims may be- paid without any action by the court. 66 In Illinois, all claims "may be filed in
the proceeding for the administration of the estate,"6 7 and each
claim so filed must then be allowed or disallowed by the court."6
The personal representative, may be surcharged for- any' payment
made prior to a formal allowance if he is not able to satisfy the court
as to its validity.6 9
Closing the Estate
The most significant difference between closing an estate in Illinois and closing an estate under the Code is, once again, the need
for any sort of formal procedures at all. In Illinois, a final account
or a motion for additional time must be filed with the court within 8
months of the personal representative's' appointment. 70 Before the
estate may be distributed, this account must .beapproved in a formal
hearing after notice to all unpaid creditors and distributees. 7' After
distribution, another order must be obtained to close the estate and to
discharge the personal representative. Under the Code, distribution
may be made without closing the estate, and all claims against the
distributees will be barred after the running of the applicable period
of limitations. 72 If the personal representative wishes additional protection, he may close the estate informally by filing a sworn closing
statement with the court, 71 or he may close the estate formally and
obtain his discharge in a single hearing after notice to all devisees. 74
These, then, are the major differences between the procedures
for administering a decedent's estate under the Illinois Probate Act
and under the Uniform Probate Code. The proponents of the Code
have asserted that its procedures would be both quicker and cheaper
than those presently in use in Illinois, 76 but questions have been
raised as to whether the Illinois system is really as costly and inefficient as it seems, and as to whether the savings of time and expense
that would result from the adoption of the Code would be worth the
66. U.P.C. § 3-807(a). Claims may be made before the expiration of the 4-month
period if the personal representative is willing to assume certain risks. See U.P.C. §
3-807(b).
67. I.P.A. § 192.
68. I.P.A. § 198.
69. I.P.A. § 203.
70. I.P.A. § 289.
71. I.P.A. § 290.
72. U.P.C. § 3-1006 and art. I, General Comment 7.
73. U.P.C. § 3-1003.
74. U.P.C. § 3-1002.
75. See, e.g., Wellman, A Reaction to the Chicago Commentary, 1970 U. ILL. L.F.
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problems of adopting an entirely new and untried system of probate.
The balance of this article will deal with these two questions.
RESEARCH DATA

One of the principal purposes of the Uniform Probate Code is "to
promote a speedy and efficient system for liquidating the estate of
the decedent and making distribution to its successors. '"76 Al

77
though launched before the recent wave of anti-probate sentiment,
the Code nevertheless received a good deal of impetus from the increasing public concern with the delays and financial expenses of

probate.78 In spite of all of the commentary that has dealt with the
legal and social ramifications of various probate systems, very little
has been done in the way of empirical research to determine what
time and expense is actually required in the administration of a de-

cedent's estate. 79

A logical first step in determining what efficien-

cies would result from the adoption of the Code is to determine what
are the actual time and cost requirements of the systems presently in

effect.

Thus, it will be the primary purpose of this article to report

536.
76.

U.P.C. § 1-102(b)(3).
See, e.g., N. DACEY, How TO AvoID PROBATE! (1965).
78. See Wellman, The New Uniform Probate Code, 56 A.B.A.J. 636 (1970).
79. This writer has found only seven studies that have undertaken the kind of research that is presented here. J. WEDGWOOD, THE ECONOMICS OF INHERITANCE (1929)
is a presentation of certain economic data from 239 British estates probated between
1924 and 1926. Harbury, Inheritance and the Distribution of Personal Wealth in Britain, 72 EcON. J. 845 (1962) is a similar study of estates probated in 1956 and 1957.
In Powell & Looker, Decedents' Estates-Illumination from Probate and Tax Records,
30 COLUM. L. REV. 919 (1930), the authors reported on a comprehensive survey of probate and tax records in four New York counties for the years 1914-1929. Ward & Beuscher, The Inheritance Process in Wisconsin, 1950 Wis. L. REV. 393 contains a similar
study in Dane County (Madison), Wisconsin for the years 1929, 1934, 1939, 1941 and
1944. In Dunham, The Method, Process and Frequency of Wealth Transmission at
Death, 30 U. CHI. L. REV. 241 (1963) [hereinafter cited as Dunham], the author reported on a survey funded by the Ford Foundation, of 170 estates probated in Cook
County (Chicago), Illinois during 1953 and 1957. More recently, a study financed by
the Russell Sage Foundation surveyed 659 estates probated in Cuyahoga County (Cleveland), Ohio between November, 1964 and August, 1965. M. SUSSMAN, 1. CATES & D.

77.

SMITH. THE FAMILY AND INHERITANCE

(1970).

The Sage Foundation study included,

in addition to a survey of public records, a report of interviews with the survivors of
the decedents and with the lawyers who had handled the surveyed estates. Although
these studies collected and correlated data similar to that which is presented here, their
primary emphasis was on the ways in which property passes at death and not on the
working of the probate process itself. Most recently, Kinsey, A Contrast of Trends in
Administrative Costs in Decedents' Estates in a Uniform Probate Code State (Idaho)
and a Non-Uniform Probate Code State (North Dakota), 50 N.D.L. REV. 523 [sic]
(1974) [hereinafter cited as Kinsey], reported a statistical study of probate costs for
estates probated in 1971, 1972 and 1973 in the two states. The author is also aware
of a comprehensive American Bar Foundation study of probate and inheritance tax
files in four Minnesota counties that has now been in progress for several years. See
Stein, ProbateAdministration: Distinguishing Fact from Fiction, PROBATE AND PIOPERTY
NEWSLETTER, ABA SECTION OF REAL PROPERTY, PROBATE & TRUST LAW 3 (vol. 3, no. 1
summer 1974).
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the results of a survey of 500 estates probated in the Circuit Court of
Cook County, Illinois during May and November of 1969, to determine how long it took and how much it cost to administer those
500 estates, and to segregate that portion of the time and expense
that was attributable to the probate process itself.80
Estates Actually Probated
In 1969, over 57,000 deaths were reported in Cook County, Illinois. s1 During the same period, only 8,070 estates were actually
probated. Whether this disparity is due to the fact that most decedents do not accumulate enough assets during their lives to require
the probate of their estates or whether it reflects a wide-spread use of
probate avoidance devices such as joint tenancies and living trusts is
not clear, but it is significant to note at the outset that in 1969, better than 85 percent of all of the decedents' estates in Cook County
were not subject to the probate laws at all. Thus, whatever changes
are made in those laws, they will affect only a small percentage of
all Illinois estates.8 2
Nature of Estates Probated
Of the 500 estates surveyed, 289 were testate and 211 were intestate. Of the 211 intestate estates, 12 were opened solely for the purpose of settling a cause of action that had survived the deceased. Of
these 12 estates, 10 involved a recovery of less than $20,000 and
only one involved an amount greater than $60,000. The use of the
probate courts for the sole purpose of recovering on a claim that accrued to the deceased raises a number of questions regarding possible abuse of the small estates procedure,' but since such proceedings
are relatively infrequent and do not involve the use of probate in its
traditional sense, these estates have been omitted from the balance
of this survey.
Also omitted are seven estates, six testate and one intestate, that
involved some form of formal contest. Both the Uniform Probate
80.

A complete discussion of the research methods used in this study is included as

Appendix A infra.

8 1. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, CoUNTY & CiTY DATA BOOK 126-27, tables 3 & 22
(1972).
82. This conclusion may be invalid if one accepts the questionable argument that a
more efficient system of probate would discourage probate avoidance and increase the
number of probate estates.
83.

See Dunham, supra note 79, at 266.
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Code and the Illinois Probate Act:provide for the filing and resolution
of: contests,8 4 but because so few of the estates appearing in the sample were contested, it was felt that -they would not provide an adequate. basis for a comparison of these provisions of the two Acts. The
primary focus of this study,. then, is the 481 uncontested estates that
were probated for purposes other than the settlement of a cause of
action. 5
Size of Estates
For purposes of analysis, .the estates surveyed were first classified on
the basis of their size. In making this classification, the figure used
for -the size of the estate was the 'dollar value of the probate estate;
that is, the amount of property -that was subject to administration in
the proceeding, before the probate court. This figure, however, does
not include all of the property that passes to a decedent's successors at his death since many assets, such as those held in joint tenancy
and in living trusts, are not passedby the will and are not reflected
in the records of the probate court. Nevertheless, the figures used do
give an accurate idea of the amounts of property that are subject to
86
the probate laws.
The size of the probate estate in each instance was determined
from the receipts section of. the final account, whenever that document gave a dollar value to each asset received. In many estates,
however, the value of property distributed in kind was not recorded
in the final accounting. In those cases, reference was made to the
inventory or, where that document was also silent as to value, to the
court's estimate of the estate's, value for the purpose of determining
attorneys' and executors' fees." This latter figure was invariably recorded by the court on the last page of the final account, and values
for real and personal property were separately stated. The court's
figure thus provided a reliable estimate of value where total value was
not stated elsewhere, and it also served as a check on the accuracy
of other figures taken from -the final account and from the inventory.
Once values were determined, the estates were classified as small,
84.

Compare U.P.C. §§ 3-406,-407 with I.P.A. §§ 90-93

85. Another 80, estates were omitted after preliminary consideration because they
had not been closed by the date of the survey.
•86. A more accurate determination of actual estate size might have been made by
an examination of state inheritance and federal estate tax returns, but such a comparison
was beyond the scope of this study.
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0-$20,000; medium, $20,001-$60,000; or large, $60,001 or more.
These categories were based primarily upon the exemptions allowed
by the state inheritance and federal estate taxes. The $20,000 cutoff reflects the exemption provided by the Illinois inheritance tax to
surviving spouses and children of the deceased, and the $6,0,000 cutoff is the basic exemption provided by the federal estate tax. s 7 Table 1 shows the number of estates within each of these classifications.ss
TABLE 1
NUMBER OF ESTATES PROBATED
0-$20,000
70
86

Type of Estate
Testate
Intestate

$60,001 +
103
20

$20,001-$60,000
84
38

Table 2 shows the average and median estate size within each
of the three size classifications.
TABLE 2
SIZE OF ESTATES (IN THOUSANDS OF DOLLARS)
Type of
Estate
Testate

Intestate

0-$20,000

Average

Median

10.46

10.20

8.0

7.8

$20,001-$60,000

$60,001 +

Median

Average

Median

35.7

32.3

256.6

124.9

34.9

33.6

204.1

109.6

Average

In comparing these two tables, it is interesting to note that the
number of testate estates probated increased as the size of the estates increased, whereas the number of intestate estates administered decreased as the estates grew larger. This is consistent with
an expected finding that the larger a person's estate, the less likely he
is to die without a will. It may also suggest the successful use of
estate planning for the purpose of probate avoidance in the smaller
testate estates. Whatever the reason for the phenomenon, it should
be of some interest in the drafting of new statutes to note that laws
governing the administration of testate estates will apply primarily to
larger estates, whereas more than half of the estates subject to the
laws of intestate distribution will have a value of less than $20,000.
87. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2052. This figure may be somewhat misleading,
since as applied here, it refers only to probate estates. Under the Code, the $60,000
exemption applies to the gross estate, a term which includes assets that are not subject
to probate. Any probate estate falling in the large category may be assumed to have
involved the filing of a federal estate tax return though not necessarily the payment of
a tax. The fact that an estate did not fall within this category, however, does not necessarily mean that a return was not required to be filed.
88. Table 1 does not include the 80 estates that were still open as of Jan. 1, 1974.
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Time Required to ProbateEstates
Of great concern to many critics of the present systems of probate
is the amount of time that it takes to administer a decedent's estate.
In seeking to reform the probate laws, it would be useful to know how
long it actually takes to distribute a decedent's property after his death
and how the time required is actually spent. In making such a determination, there are two periods of time that must be considered:
the period between the date of the decedent's death and the date that
the estate is opened; and the period between the date that the estate
is opened and the date that it is closed. Table 3 shows the periods
of time elapsing between the date of death and the opening of the
estate.
TABLE 3
TIME REQUIRED TO OPEN ESTATES (IN WEEKS)
Type of
Estate
Testate
Intestate

0-$20,000

Average

Median

26.9
33.3

7.5
7.0

$20,001-$60,000

Average
9.9
10.3

Median
4.0
3.0

$60,001 +

Average
4.3
6.2

Median
3.0
2.5

The median figures here, as in most of the tables, are more accurate indicators of the norm than are the averages which tend to be
distorted by a few atypical estates.8" During the period between the
death of the decedent and the opening of the estate, the family is primarily concerned with funeral arrangements and with providing for
the survivors' living expenses. With few exceptions, however, most
of the estates were opened within 2 months of the decedent's death.
Significantly, as the size of the estate increased, the time taken to
open it decreased. This may be attributable to the fact that persons having an interest in estates of greater size are more concerned
with their rapid distribution. It may also reflect a greater availability of counsel to persons with larger estates or perhaps even a greater
efficiency of counsel in dealing with wealthier clients. Of greater interest to the legislative draftsman, however, are the relative times required to open testate and intestate estates of comparable size.
When a decedent dies intestate, there is no requirement that his estate be opened within a fixed period of time.9 0 But when a dece89. The testate estates in the 0-$20,000 category included one estate that took 519
weeks to open and another that took 332. In the 0-$20.000 intestate category, one
estate took 407 weeks to open, a second took 365 and a third took 696!
90. I.P.A. § 95 provides only that letters of administration will be issued whenever
a petition for them is filed.
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dent dies testate, the person in possession of his will must file it in the
probate court within 30 days of his death.9 1 Filing alone does not
open the estate, however, and a testate estate is not formally opened
until the will is admitted to probate and an executor is appointed
by the court. Under Illinois law, a petition to admit a will to probate must be filed by the nominated executor within 30 days after he
learns of his nomination or he may forfeit his right to serve. 2 Furthermore, if a petition for probate is not filed within 30 days of
death, the court may proceed to probate the will without the filing of
a petition.9 3
With strict time requirements for opening a testate estate and the
lack of such requirements for the opening of intestate estates, one
would expect that most testate estates would be opened sooner than
most intestate estates. The median figures in Table 3 indicate, however, that in most cases there is very little difference in the time required to open intestate and testate estates. In fact, most intestate
estates were actually opened slightly faster than were most testate
estates of comparable size. This might lead one to conclude that the
self-interest of interested parties may be enough to insure the prompt
opening of most estates, and that statutory restrictions have little, if
any, motivating effect.
The second significant period of time in the administration of an
estate is that elapsing between the date that the estate is opened and
the date that it is closed. Of the 500 estates surveyed, 80, 26 testate
and 54 intestate, were still open as of January 1, 1974. In many
of these estates, very little had been done beyond the formal opening
of the estate. In several, no assets were found and the petition for
probate had been withdrawn. In many more, no inventory or accounting was ever filed. There was very little in these 80 estates that
could be of use to this study without distorting the results. For
these reasons, these estates will be excluded from further consideration.
For the remaining 401 estates, Table 4 shows the number of months
that elapsed between the date that the estate was opened and the
date that it was formally closed.9 4
91.
92.

I.P.A. § 60.
I.P.A. § 62.

93. I.P.A. § 66.
94. It should be
tributed before they
the time it takes the

In practice, however, this is virtually never done.
noted, however, that many, if not most estates are informally disare formally closed. See Dunham, supra note 79, at 268. Thus,
decedent's heirs and legatees to receive his assets may actually be
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TABLE

4

TIME REQUIRED TO CLOSE ESTATES (IN MONTHS)
Type of
Estate

0-$20,000

$20,001-$60,000

Average Median
Testate
Intestate

18.4
22.7

14.5
18.0

Average
17.3
21.4

Median
16.0
15.0

$60,001 +

Average
24.4
22.2

Median
23.0
20.0

During this period of time, the estate is primarily involved in the
technicalities of administration. Assets must be collected and inventoried, claims must be filed and paid, taxes must be paid and the
estate must be prepared for distribution. The figures in Table 4 seem
to indicate that, at least with respect to the testate estates, the larger
estates take the longest time to administer. With respect to the medium
and large estates, they also seem to indicate that most intestate estates
are administered faster than most testate estates. 9 5
It is interesting to note that in 1969 the period for filing claims
against a decedent's estate was 7 months from the date that the estate
was opened. Since an estate may be closed at any time after the
period for the filing of claims has expired, all of these estates theoretically could have been closed within 9 months of the date that they
were opened. In even the fastest category, however, the mean time
for the closing of estates was more than 5 months longer than the
shortest time in which these estates might have been closed. The
question then is, what factors are responsible for this additional delay?
One possibility is that delay is caused by actions required by the Illinois probate laws themselves. A survey of probate records cannot
by itself reveal all of the actions that are taken by a personal representative in the administration of an estate, but a review of the probate court's docket books did reveal all of the actions taken in an
estate that required the participation of the court. Since most of
the procedural requirements of the Probate Act do require court participation, at least some idea of the amount of probate related delay can
be determined through a review of these records.
Table 5 shows the types of probate related actions that were taken
vhAi les-s tiithfiflectedi

s6
95.

thhfigifres of Table 4. .

The apparent aberration in intestate estates between 0 and $20,000 may be due

to inaccuracies in the sampling or it may be due to special characteristics inherent in
this class of estates that required a greater expenditure of time. It should be recalled,
however, that nearly twice as many of the estates still open as of January 1, 1974, were
intestate rather than testate.

If all of the estates still open were closed and added into

the results, the figures in Table 3 might be considerably different.
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with respect to the surveyed estates. The categories listed include:
claims against .the estate,:, both contested and uncontested; sales of
estate property; distributions of estate property; determinations of
taxes, attorneys' and representatives' fees, and a broad class of actions designated as'.Other. This last category includes such things
as filing the will, opening the estate, proving up heirship, filing and
approval of inventories, setting and altering bond, filing appearances, appointment of guardians ad litem, filing and approval of accounts and other miscellaneous activities related to the administration
of the estate that required the participation of the court. Each entry
in the docket book was treated as a separate action unless two actions on the same day were so. related as. to constitute only a single
activity. 96
Since relatively few actions fell within the Claims, Sales, and Distributions, Fees and Taxes categories, the first figure in each of these
categories represents the percentage of estates in which the particular
type of action was taken. The second figure shows the average number of times the particular action was taken in those estates that involved that action.97 Since every estate involved actions falling in
the Other category, only the class averages and medians are shown
for this category of actions.
Table 5 indicates .that the number, of Other actions in the various
classes of estates remains fairly constant. In the testate estates,
the number decreases slightly as the size of the estates increases,
whereas in the intestate estates, 'the reverse seems to be true. These
changes are so small that they probably do not signify anything terribly
important, but in the other categories the differences are a bit more
pronounced.
Approximately four times as many small and medium size intestate estates and nearly three times as many large intestate estates involved contested claims as did'testate estates of similar size. Similarly, the percentage of intestate estates involving uncontested claims
and actions related to sales, distributions, fees and taxes was uniformly larger than it was for testate estates of the same size, the only
96. Thus, a court may have approved an inventory and, on the same day, ordered
an alteration in the personal representative's bond because of a change in the estimated
value of the estate. While this would appear as two separate entries in the docket book,
it would be treated as only one "action" for the-purposes of Table 5.

97. Thus, in the 70 testate estates of less than $20,000, there were only three estates,
or 4.3 percent of the total, in which actions were taken with respect to .contested claims.
In these three estates, a total of seven contested claim actions were taken for an average
of 2.3 per estate.
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exception being in estates of $60,001 or more where actions related
to distributions, fees and taxes appeared in a greater percentage of
testate than intestate estates. Table 5 indicates that intestate estates require more court involvement than do testate estates of similar size. This would seem to suggest that intestate estates would be
costlier and more time consuming to probate. As we have seen,
however, intestate estates do not take significantly longer to close than
testate estates and, as we shall also see, they do not involve significantly greater expense. The explanation apparently is that most
of the actions required in intestate estates are also required in testate
estates, but in the testate estates, the statutory requirement of court
involvement has been waived by the will.9 8 While the court records
thus reflect a greater degree of court involvement in the intestate estates, the time and expense generated by this additional involvement
does not appear to be substantial.
In view of this, one might conclude that statutory provisions requiring court approval of a personal representative's activities have very
little to do with delays in the administration of estates, since they
merely require formal approval of actions that would be taken in any
event, and that there would be no significant change in the time required to distribute an estate if formal approvals were not required.
It would appear that delays in the probate process are caused by
factors other than the provisions of the Probate Act itself. It follows
from this that changes in those provisions, whatever other ends they
might serve, would not significantly lessen the time required to administer an estate.
Expenses of Administration
The second significant area of concern in probate reform is the expense involved in the administration of estates. Many seem to feel
that the costs of probate would decrease significantly if the probate
laws were simplified. Before it can be determined whether or not
this would be true, it is necessary to determine just what expenses
are actually incurred during the administration of an estate.
Table 6 shows the amount of shrinkage that took place in the estates that are included in this survey. For the purpose of this table, shrinkage is defined as the difference between the total value of
the estate collected by the personal representative and the value of
98.

See, e.g., I.P.A. §§ 213.1, 246.
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the estate distributed to the heirs and legatees after all expenses of
administration had been paid. The term expenses of administration
includes all disbursements made by the executor or administrator
other than in final distribution of the estate.
TABLE

6

SHRINKAGE OF ESTATES (IN THOUSANDS OF DOLLARS)
Type of
Estate
Testate
Intestate

0-$20,000
Average
4.1
3.4

Median
3.3
2.9

$20,001-$60,000
Average
6.3
8.3

Median
5.9
5.8

$60,001 +
Average
62.3
48.6

Median
22.6
24.5

Perhaps the most surprising thing about this table is the relationship between the shrinkage of testate and intestate estates. In the
0-$20,000 range, the median intestate estate actually experienced
less shrinkage than the median testate estate. In the $20,001-$60,000
range, the amount of shrinkage was roughly the same for both. In
estates of $60,001 or more, the shrinkage of intestate estates was
slightly greater than that of testate estates. One would hardly expect
there to be more shrinkage in testate than in intestate estates, but this
appears to be the case in the two smaller classes of estates. Even in
the larger estates one would expect the difference in shrinkage to be
greater than it is. These figures by themselves, however, may be
misleading.
In Table 2, the median testate estate in the 0-$20,000 category
was $10,200 whereas the median intestate estate in the same category was $7,800. Table 6 shows the median shrinkage in 0-$20,000
testate estates to be $3,300, or roughly 32.4 percent of the median
testate estate in that category. The median shrinkage in the same
category of intestate estates was only $2,900, but this figure is 37.2
percent of the median intestate estate in that category. Similarly, in
the $60,001 plus category the median shrinkage in the intestate estates was 22.4 percent of the median estate whereas in the testate
estates it was only 18.1 percent of the median estate. This relation
ship breaks down in the $20,001-$60,000 category, where the percentage of shrinkage is still slightly higher in the testate estates than
it is in the intestates. 9 The discrepancy, however, may be attributable to inaccuracies in the sampling rather than to any characteristics
inherent in these estates.
99.
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These problems aside, the primary questions for our consideration
are what costs are primarily responsible for this shrinkage of estates
and to what extent are these costs attributable to our present system
of probate? In seeking to answer this question we will first consider
those costs and expenses that are directly related to the court's involvement in the probate process itself. These will be referred to as
Probate Expenses and include such things as court costs, witness fees,
costs of publication, costs of locating heirs and the costs of obtaining
certified copies of various documents. Table 7 reflects the average
and median probate expenses in each of the three classes of estates.
TABLE

7

PROBATE EXPENSES (IN DOLLARS)
Type of
Estate
Testate
Intestate

0-$20,000
Average
$146.50
$110.15

Median
$144.50
$113.50

$20,001-$60,000
Average
$176.30
$171.24

Median
$153.50
$127.50

$60,001 +
Average
$212.30
$162.42

Median
$172.00
$148.00

Relatively speaking, probate expenses account for only a small percentage of total shrinkage, and they increase only slightly with the
size of the estate. In the testate estates, the median probate costs
represented 4.4 percent of median shrinkage in the 0-$20,000 category, 2.5 percent in the $20,001-$60,000 category and only .8 percent in estates of $60,001 or more. In intestate estates, probate expenses represented 3.9 percent of median shrinkage in estates of $20,000 or less, 2.2 percent in estates of $20,001-$60,000, and .6 percent in estates of $60,001 or more. Thus, expenses directly generated by the probate process do not place a substantial financial burden upon the estate, and as the size of the estate increases, the proportional burden decreases dramatically.
All of this would be fine if persons interested in an estate handled
its administration themselves, but such is not the case. The expenses
engendered by the personal representative and the attorney for the
estate are substantially more significant than those that result from
the probate process itself. A personal representative must be appointed in all probated estates and, unless the representative is a qualified trust company or a public administrator, 10 0 he must post a bond as
security for the performance of his duties. In addition, unless surety
100.

See I.P.A. §§ 147, 164.
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is waived in the will, the representative's bond must be secured by a
commercial bonding company, and the cost of this bond will be an
expense of administration. In testate estates, surety is almost invariably waived, and in this survey only seven testate estates were
found in which a secured bond was required of an executor. In intestate estates, however, surety is required of every individual personal
representative other than the public administrator. Table 8 shows
the costs of administrator's bonds in the intestate estates surveyed.
TABLE 8
COST OF SURETY ON BOND (IN DOLLARS)
Type of
Estate
Intestate

0-$20,000
Average
$109

Median
$85

$20,001-$60,000
Average
$313

Median
$273

$60,C01 +
Average
$1106

Median
$700

In intestate estates of $20,000 or less, the median bond expense
was 2.9 percent of the median shrinkage; in estates of $20,001-$60,000
it was 4.7 percent, and in estates of more than $60,000, median bond
expense was 2.9 percent of median shrinkage. Thus, while the cost
of surety in intestate estates was an identifiable cost of administration,
it was not responsible for a significant amount of shrinkage.
A more significant expense was the personal representative's fee.
This expense, however, was a difficult one to classify. It varied
greatly depending upon whether the representative was a corporation
or an individual, and upon the relationship that existed between the
personal representative and the deceased. When the personal representative was a corporation, the fees charged tended to be higher
than when the representative was an individual. When an individual
personal representative was close to the deceased or had an interest
in the estate, fees were often waived entirely. Table 9 shows the frequency with which corporate representatives were used in the administration of estates and Table 10 shows the percentage of estates in which
individual representatives' fees were waived.
There is no real pattern in the use of corporate representatives
except that, perhaps predictably, they were used most frequently in
the larger testate estates. Table 10, however, does show some interesting patterns in the waiver of the personal representative's fee.
In the testate estates, the frequency with which the fee is waived
decreases as the size of the estate, and perhaps not coincidentally,
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TABLE 9
NUMBER OF ESTATES IN WHICH CORPORATIONS
WERE USED AS PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVES
Type of
Estate

Testate
Intestate

0-$20,000
Corporation
2
4

Individual
68
65

$20,001-$60,000
Corporation
9
0

Individual
75
32

$60,001 4Corporation
28
3

Individual
78
14

TABLE 10
PERCENTAGE OF ESTATES IN WHICH PERSONAL
REPRESENTATIVES' FEES WERE WAIVED
Type of
Estate

0-$20,000

$20,001-$60,000

$60,001 +

Testate
Intestate

76.5
56.9

57.3
71.9

59.0
78.6

the size of the fee, increases. This tendency reverses slightly in the
largest estates, but this apparent inconsistency might be explained by
the greatly increased use of corporate executors in these estates. It
might be argued that in these very large estates, where the executor's duties are extensive and complicated, an individual executor
who might otherwise have claimed a fee would be more inclined to
refuse to serve in favor of a corporate executor who is named as an alternate in the will.
In the intestate estates, the incidence of waiver increases with the
size of the estate in a pattern that is almost directly opposite to that
of the testate estates. One can only speculate as to the reasons for
this. Perhaps because an administrator is more likely to be an heir
of the decedent than is an executor, 0 1 he is more likely to waive
his fee and take his distributive share in the larger estates than he
would in the smaller estates where his distributive share would be
significantly enhanced by his fee. All of this is pure speculation,
however, and a good deal more research would be needed before
any sound conclusions could be drawn.
Tables 9 and 10 show the incidence of the use of corporate and individual representatives other than the public administrator or administrators to collect. It might be interesting to look briefly at these
101.

See I.P.A. § 96.
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other two types of personal representatives before moving on to the
question of fees.
Under the Illinois Probate Act, the court may appoint an administrator to collect:
when any contingency happens which is productive of delay in
the issuance of letters testamentary or of administration and it
appears to the court that the estate of the decedent is liable to
I
o
waste, loss, or embezzlement ....
An administrator to collect has most of the powers of an administrator and must post a secured bond unless it qualifies as an exempt
trust company. 1°3 A public administrator for each county, on the
other hand, is appointed by the Governor for a term of 4 years' 04 and
administers all intestate estates for which there is no other person in the
State with a prior right to act as administrator. 0 5 The public administrator has the same duties as other administrators but he is required
only to post a single bond when he assumes his duties rather than to post
06
separate bonds for each estate that he administers.1
Table 11 shows the frequency with which administrators to collect were used in testate and intestate estates, and the frequency
with which the public administrator was appointed in intestate estates.
TABLE 11
NUMBER OF ADMINISTRATORS TO COLLECT

AND PUBLIC ADMINISTRATORS USED IN
TESTATE AND INTESTATE ESTATES
Type of

Estate

0-$20,000
Testate

Administrator
To Collect
Public

Intestate

0

Administrator

$20,001-$60,000

2

17

Testate
0

Intestate
2

5

$60,001 +
Testate
1

Intestate
0

3

It would appear from these figures that administrators to collect are
used only rarely, especially in testate estates, and that the use of the
public administrator in intestate estates decreases as the size of the
estates increases.
102.

103.

I.P.A. § 105.

I.P.A. H9 107, 147, 148.

104.

I.P.A. § 163.

106.

I.P.A. H9 164, 166.

105.
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Tables 12 and 13 reflect the fees charged by corporate and individual personal representatives. The figures shown are the average and
median fees for those estates in which a personal representative's fee
was charged.
TABLE

12

CORPORATE PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVES'

FEES (IN THOUSANDS OF DOLLARS)
Type of
Estate
Testate
Intestate

0-$20,000
Average Median
.7
.7
.5
.6

$20,001-$60,000
Average Median
2.1
2.0
-

TABLE

$60,001 ±
Average Median
9.6
4.0
6.3
4.4

13

INDIVIDUAL PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVES'

FEES (IN THOUSANDS OF DOLLARS)
Type of
Estate
Testate
Intestate

0-$20,000

$20,001-$60,000

Average

Median

Average

Median

.5
.4

.5
.2

1.2
1.4

1.1
1.3

$60,001 +

Average
3.8
3.3

Median
3.0
3.6

As might be expected, the corporate representatives' fees in both
testate and intestate estates were higher than the individual representatives' fees for the same size estates. Just as predictably, the fees
charged in testate as well as in intestate estates increased with the size
of the estate.
In those testate estates where a corporate executor was appointed, executors' fees represented 5 percent, 5 percent and 2 percent of the median probate estate and accounted for 24 percent,
31 percent and 15 percent of the median shrinkage in the small, medium and large estates, respectively. In the small intestate estates,
the median corporate administrator's fee was 5 percent of the median probate estate and accounted for 14 percent of the median shrinkage. In large intestate estates, corporate administrators' fees were
3 percent of the median probate estate and accounted for 13 percent
of the median shrinkage. No medium size intestate estates appearing in the survey were administered by a corporate administrator.
Individual executors' fees represented 4 percent, 3 percent and
3 percent of the median small, medium and large testate estates, respectively, and accounted for 14 percent, 20 percent and 16 percent of
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median shrinkage. In the intestate estates, individual administrators'
fees represented 3 percent, 4 percent and 3 percent of the median
small, medium and large estates in which fees were not waived and
they accounted for 8 percent, 28 percent and 18 percent of median
shrinkage.
From these figures, we may at least conclude that the personal
representative's fee is a significant expense of probate in those estates
in which a fee is charged. It also appears, at least in estates of
$60,000 or less, that the corporate representative's fee is greater
than that of the individual representative and accounts for a greater
percentage of estate shrinkage. In estates of more than $60,000, however, individual representatives' fees, viewed as a percentage of the
probate estate, were actually somewhat higher than those charged by
corporations. The reasons for this distribution are not clear; and
because the sampling of estates involving corporate representatives
was so small in some of the categories, these figures may be misleading. Finally, it appears that the personal representative's fee places
the heaviest burden on estates between $20,001 and $60,000. Once
again, however, the sampling of corporate representatives was so small
that the results may not be entirely accurate.
Another class of expenses is somewhat easier to analyze. Every probate estate is represented by an attorney and virtually every
attorney charges a fee. Table 14 shows the average and median attorneys' fees charged in the estates surveyed.
TABLE 14
ATTORNEYS' FEES (IN THOUSANDS OF DOLLARS)
Type of
Estate
Testate
Intestate

0-$20,000

$20,001-$60,000

Average

Median

Average

Median

.8
.7

.8
.6

1.7
1.8

1.7
1.8

$60,001 ±

Average
6.1
4.1

Median
4.0
4.0

In the testate estates of $20,000 or less, the median attorney's
fee represented 7.8 percent of the median estate and 24.2 percent
of median shrinkage. In the $20,001-$60,000 category, median attorneys' fees were 5.3 percent of the median estate and 28.8 percent of median shrinkage, and in the testate estates larger than $60,000, they represented 3.2 percent of the median estate and 17.7
percent of median shrinkage. In the intestate estates, median attorneys' fees represented 7.7 percent, 5.4 percent and 3.7 percent of the
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small, medium and large median estates, respectively, and accounted
for 20.7 percent, 31 percent and 16.3 percent of median shrinkage in
the same classes of estates.
Percentage attorneys' fees were roughly the same for testate and
intestate estates and as the size of the estate increased, the percentage of the estate paid in attorneys' fees decreased. Attorneys' fees
also accounted for a fairly substantial portion of estate shrinkage. In
both the testate and the intestate estates, attorneys' fees, like executors' fees, accounted for the greatest portion of shrinkage in estates
of $20,001-$60,000, with 28.8 percent and 31 percent, respectively. In estates of more than $60,000, attorneys' fees accounted
for 17.7 percent of the shrinkage of testate estates and 16.3 percent
of the shrinkage of intestate estates, and in estates of less than
$20,000, attorneys' fees accounted for 24.2 percent of intestate and
20.7 percent of testate shrinkage.
Like the personal representative's fee, the attorney's fee is a significant expense of probate, especially in the small and medium size
estate, and unlike the representative's fee, it is charged in virtually
every estate administered.
These, then, are the expenses of probate that were directly or
indirectly related to procedures that were made necessary by the
provisions of the Illinois Probate Act. The balance of estate shrinkage presumably resulted from other, non-probate expenses, and Table 15 shows the percentage of shrinkage attributable to expenses
other than those discussed above.
TABLE

15

PERCENTAGE OF SHRINKAGE ATTRIBUTABLE

TO NON-PROBATE EXPENSES
Type of
Estate

0-$20,000

$20,001-$60,000

$60,001 ±

Testate
Intestate

71.4
65.5

68.7
62.1

74.5
80.2

Table 15 confirms what has now become rather obvious; that
probate related expenses are not responsible for most of the shrinkage in an administered estate. In large estates, less than one quarter
of the median shrinkage is attributable to probate expenses, bonding
costs, personal representatives' fees and attorneys' fees. Even in the
medium size estates, which have traditionally shown the greatest
amount of probate related shrinkage, only 30-40 percent of median
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shrinkage is attributable to probate related expense. It is significant
that even if all probate related expenses were to be eliminated, less
than one half of the expenses of administering an estate would be saved,
While it is not the purpose of this article to investigate the nature of these non-probate costs, 0 7 at least one area of non-probate
expenses may be of some special interest and will be treated briefly at
this point. Table 16 shows the federal and State taxes paid out of the
estates surveyed. Included in the federal taxes are the federal estate
tax, the federal fiduciary income taxes and the income and other federal taxes owed by the decedent at the time of his death and paid out
of the estate. Included in the State taxes are the Illinois inheritance
tax, the Illinois income tax, for the estate as well as for the decedent, the personal property tax and any real estate taxes that may
have been paid on estate property.
TABLE
STATE
Type of

Estate

TAXES (IN THOUSANDS OF DOLLARS)

0-$20,000
Testate

Federal
State

& FEDERAL

.1
.4

0
.2

16

$20,001-$60,000

$60,001 +

Intestate

Testate

Intestate

.01
.1

.3
.7

1.0
.8

0
0

0
.5

0
.7

Testate

29.2
10.5

3.8
3.4

Intestate

19.8
9.8

6.1
1.5

From this table, it can be seen that while taxes are not a significant
expense in the smaller estates, they account respectively for 31.9 percent
and 31 percent of the shrinkage in the large testate and intestate estates
and thus represent a substantial portion of thes shrinkage attributable
to expenses other than those related to probate.4)
CONCLUSIONS

These, then, are some of the factors responsible for the delays
and expenses of probate. The question that remains is the extent
to which these delays and expenses would be reduced if the Uniform Probate Code were adopted in Illinois.
107.

For a more thorough investigation of these expenses, see Dunham, supra note

79, at 272.
108. In addition to being responsible for a substantial amount of shrinkage, federal
and
state taxes
may also
account
for atakes
significant
amount of
themonths
time required
to close
an estate.
A federal
estate
tax return
approximately
6-10
to process
once
it has been filed and an Illinois Inheritance Tax return may take from 2-4 months for
processing. Both of these returns must be approved before the estate may be closed.
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Delay
There seems to be little question but that the adoption of the
Uniform Probate Code would result in less work in the administration of a decedent's estate. Less court involvement and greater discretion in the personal representative, would necessarily reduce the
amount of paperwork presently involved in the probate process, and
this in turn would reduce the amount of effort required of the attorney representing the estate. It is by no means clear, however, that
this saving of work would result in significant savings of time in the
administration of an estate.
It was pointed out that there are two relevant periods of time in
the administration of a decedent's estate: the period between the date
of death and the date on which the estate is opened; and the period
between the date on which the estate is opened and the date on
which it is closed. Under the Uniform Probate Code, an estate need
not be opened at all if the decedent's heirs or legatees are in possession of his property at his death or if no one claims or takes possession of his property for a period of 3 years after his death. 10 9 Thus,
if an estate is never opened, probate would, quite literally, take no
time at all. The problem is that unless a decedent's successors are
in possession of his property when he dies, they must wait for 3
years before they can take possession, and, if a third party is in possession of the decedent's property, his successors cannot take possession
at all without probating the will.
If an estate is to be administered under the Code, it must be
opened and a personal representative must be appointed within 3
years of the decedent's death or the decedent will be presumed to have
died intestate and no administration will be allowed." 0 The only
similar provisions under the Illinois Act are the penalties provided
under sections 62 and 66 for failing to file a will and open an estate within 30 days of the decedent's death. As we have seen,"' however, these provisions do not seem to be very effective since there is
no substantial difference between the time required to open testate estates, which are subject to the 30 day requirements, and the time
required to open intestate estates, which are not. Thus, one might
predict that, under the Uniform Probate Code as well as under the
Illinois Probate Act, the self interest of the decedent's heirs and lega109. U.P.C.-§§ 3-102,-108.
110. U.P.C. § 3-108, Comment at 83.
111.

See text accompanying notes 92 and 93 supra.
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tees would continue to be the primary factor determining the time
within which an estate would be opened; that the nature of the limitations imposed by law would have very little effect on the length of
this pre-opening period; and that there would therefore be no significant change in the amount of time required to open most estates.
The same would probably be true of the time required to administer the estate after it is opened. Under the Code, an estate need
not be closed unless there has been a supervised administration or an
interested party requires a formal closing procedure, and the "date
opened-date closed" time period would be irrelevant. The relevant
period of time under the Code would be the period between the date
the estate is opened and the date the decedent's assets are fully distributed.
If there is to be no administration, a decedent's heirs may, under
the Code, take immediate possession of the assets to which they are
entitled, but the assets taken remain subject to all claims, taxes and
other expenses of administration." 2 If the estate is administered, the
decedent's property may be distributed at the discretion of the personal representative, but the distributed property remains subject to
the claims of creditors and of disappointed heirs and legatees until
the expiration of 3 years from the date of the decedent's death or 1
1 3
year from the date of the distribution, whichever is later. 1
In Illinois, an estate may be distributed at any time after the 6month period for the filing of claims has expired. If the estate is
large enough to pay all foreseeable claims, however, the personal representative may, after posting bond, obtain leave of court to distribute
the assets within 6 months of the decedent's death.1 4 Thus, under
the Illinois Probate Act and under the Uniform Probate Code, the time
for the distribution of the decedent's estate is largely within the discretion of the personal representative. The Illinois Act does restrict
distribution within the period for the filing of claims when the estate
is not sufficient to cover the claims that might be filed but, realistically, no representative will distribute assets when, in so doing he may
become personally liable to the estate's creditors." 5 And when the
assets are clearly sufficient to cover the estate's obligations, the largely
formalistic requirements of section 292 do not significantly delay distribution.
112.
113.
114.
115.
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U.P.C. § 3-901.
U.P.C. § 3-1006.
I.P.A. § 292.
See U.P.C. § 3-1005, Comment at 177.
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In view of this, and in view of the fact that the time required
to administer an estate is not significantly affected by the court involvement required by the Illinois Act, one might predict that the
adoption of the Uniform Probate Code would not significantly shorten
the period required to administer an Illinois estate.
Expenses of Administration
Our second area of concern is the expense involved in the administration of a decedent's estate. It should be remembered, of
course, that in this regard, anywhere from 60 percent to 80 percent
of the shrinkage in the average estate is caused by factors entirely unrelated to the probate process. 110 Thus, whatever savings may be
effected by the adoption of the Code will only be in those areas
which account for approximately 20-40 percent of the shrinkage of a
decedent's estate.
Expenses arising directly out of the probate process itself could
be partially or even completely eliminated under the Uniform Probate
Code, depending upon the degree of formality with which the estate
is administered. If no estate is ever opened and the decedent's assets are distributed without administration, there would be no probate expense at all since the court would never become involved in
the estate and there would be no publication expenses, notice requirements, witness fees, guardian ad litem's fees or the like. If the estate
is probated but distributed without administration, there would probably be a minimal filing or court fee,' 17 but once again most of the
expenses presently generated in Illinois would be avoided.
If an estate were formally probated under the Code, the expenses of probate presumably would be greater because of the increased involvement of the court and the additional requirements of
116.
117.

See Table 15supra.
This discussion assumes that the filing fees charged by the court will bear some

relation to the amount of effort required of it in the administrat'on of the estate. There
is evidence, however, that, at least in some states, this is not the case. In Wisconsin,
for example, where a version of article III of the U.P.C. is now in effect, the courts
are still charging filing fees based solely on the size of the estate. Thus. for an estate

of less than $1,000, there is no filing fee at all, but for an estate of $100,000 or more,
there is a fee of $100 for each $100.000 of the estate.

This kind of fee is a de facto

estate tax and its amount would probably not be greatly affected by the adoption of the
U.P.C.
In Illinois, the court charges a flat fee of $10 for estates of less than $5,000 and $75
for estates of $5,000 or more. This seems to be somewhat more closely related to actual court expenses and it would probably reflect any decrease in the efforts of a court

that may result from the adoption of the U.P.C.
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If the estate were administered, probate expenses would

be greater still; their exact amount depending upon whether the personal representative was formally or informally appointed and upon
whether there was a supervised or an unsupervised administration.
Even in a formal, supervised administration, however, probate expenses would probably be less under the Code than they are now in
Illinois." 9
The adoption of the U.P.C., therefore, would undoubtedly result
in significant savings in the limited area of probate expenses, but it
must be remembered that these expenses represent only a small percentage of total shrinkage, even in the smallest estates. These savings
would not be very significant in relation to the overall expense of
administering an estate.
Savings would also be realized under the U.P.C. in the area of
the personal representative's bond. In informal proceedings under
the Code, bond would not normally be required of a personal representative, and in formal proceedings, bond could be waived by the
court even where it would otherwise be required by the Code. 2 '
When a bond is required, its amount would be considerably less than
it is under the Illinois Act,' 2 ' and when a surety is required on the bond,
that requirement could be satisfied under the Code by a co-signer willing
to pledge property sufficient to cover the amount of the bond.' 22 It is
predictable, therefore, that under the Code, most of the bonding expense involved in administering Illinois intestate estates could be
eliminated. As with probate costs, however, bonding expenses represent only a small part of the total shrinkage in a given estate, and the
savings realized would not be all that great in relation to the overall
costs of administration.
Two probate related expenses that do account for a significant
amount of shrinkage, however, are the personal representatives' and
attorneys' fees.
The personal representative is primarily concerned with the collection and administration of the estate assets and not with the pro118.

119.

See U.P.C. §§ 3-401 to-403.

Even in a supervised administration, a personal representative has all of the

powers of an unsupervised representative except as they are restricted by the court.
U.P.C. § 3-501. Thus, unless a supervised administrator is made subject to all of the
restrictions of Illinois law, there would still be less court involvement than there is under
present Illinois practice.
120. U.P.C. § 3-603.
121. Compare U.P.C. § 3-604 with I.P.A. § 151.

122.

U.P.C. § 3-604, Comment at 121.
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cedural technicalities of probate. It is true, of course, that the personal representative is responsible for seeing that the legal requirements of administration are carried out, but in reality, it is the lawyer who normally sees to those details and who is compensated for
handling them. The personal representative's compensation is paid
primarily in return for his activities with respect to the estate property itself and, accordingly, it should not be significantly affected by a
lessening of court involvement in administration. In fact, the nature
of the duties imposed upon a personal representative under the Code
is such as would probably justify an increase rather than a decrease
in his fee.
In Illinois, the personal representative's duties are restricted to
collecting the decedent's assets, preserving them during the period of
administration and then distributing them in accordance with the will
or the laws of intestate distribution. If he wishes to do anything other
than collect, preserve and distribute and is not given additional powers under the will, he must seek the intervention of the court; and
this is a matter that will normally be handled by the attorney for
the estate. Once the estate is closed, as every estate must be under
Illinois law, the personal representative is freed of any future liability
to those persons who were notified of the hearing on his final account.12 3
Under the Code, the personal representative is given the status of a
trustee.124 He has broad discretionary powers and may take many
actions with respect to the estate without testamentary authority and
without the intervention of the court.' 25 If the estate is not closed,
as it need not be under the Code, the personal representative remains
liable to all interested persons for the term of the applicable statute
1 27
of limitations,' 26 and he is entitled to a "reasonable compensation"
in return for his services. One would expect, therefore, that a "reasonable compensation" for the acceptance of the duties and liabilities imposed upon a personal representative under the Code might
be considerably greater than it would be for the relatively limited duties and obligations of a personal representative in Illinois. One might
also expect that, in view of these greater obligations, a testator would
more frequently choose, and a nominated personal representative
123. See I.P.A. § 290.

124. U.P.C. §§ 3-711, -712.
125. U.P.C. § 3-704.
126. U.P.C. § 3-1005.
127. U.P.C. § 3-719.
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would more frequently defer, to the more experienced and more expensive corporate trustee.
Thus, personal representatives' fees
would probably be greater and account for a larger percentage of
shrinkage under the Code than they do under the present system of
probate in Illinois.
Attorneys' fees, on the other hand, could be the one area of significant savings under the Code. With court involvement reduced to
a minimum and with the personal representative taking on greater
responsibilities and given greater discretion to act without leave of
court, one would expect that the need for the services of an attorney
would be greatly reduced in many estates and eliminated entirely in
some. Presumably, the attorney's fee, which is frequently the most
substantial probate related expense of administration, would be reduced accordingly, but the authors of the Uniform Probate Code have
themselves suggested that this may not be the case.
The Code, unlike the Illinois Probate Act,' 28 makes no provision for the payment of attorneys' fees. Section 3-715(21) authorizes the personal representative to employ an attorney, and section
3-715(18) authorizes him to pay "expenses incident to the administration of the estate." Unlike U.P.C. section 3-719, which entitles the
personal representative to a reasonable compensation for his services,
there is no provision in the Code that establishes how much the attorney is to be paid. It is suggested, however, that "expenses incident to the administration of the estate" would include the attorney's
fee, and in the December 1972 issue of the U.P.C. Notes,12 9 one of
the Code's editors addressed this specific question.
After first noting that the Code would save lawyers both time and
expense in probating an estate, the author suggested that the choice
of procedures available under the U.P.C. would result in a more "creative" role for the estate attorney, and that this greater "creativity"
calls for greater responsibility and, therefore, a higher fee.
Responsibility . . . is certainly worth compensating, and I would
submit that under the Code the personal representative and the
attorney have more, not less responsibility because of the options
available and the lack of court supervision. They've also got
more liability, of course, and it seems to me that this deserves to
be compensated. . . . [U]nder the UPC the attorney's role is
a creative one, a responsible one, and it deserves a fair fee.
128. See I.P.A. § 337.
129. Moore, Attorneys' Fees Under the Code, U.P.C. Notes, No. 3, Dec., 1972, at
1. U.P.C. Notes is the official publication of the Joint Editorial Board of the U.P.C.
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. . . [W]ork done that involves creativity and responsibility is
going to be, or at least should be, better compensated than rather
routine work. 180
Whether this is mere pro-U.P.C. propaganda designed to win the
support of the more money-conscious elements of the bar or whether
it is a realistic estimate of how lawyers will be paid under the Code
remains to be seen. Of possible interest on this point, however, is a
1966 survey of fees and commissions in all 50 states which showed
that attorneys' fees in the only 2 states which then provided for the
independent administration of estates were significantly higher than
they were in many states which allowed only supervised administration.1 3 ' Thus, while it might be a bit premature to predict that the
U.P.C. will result in a financial windfall to the probate bar, it is
probably safe to say that its adoption would not result in any significant savings of attorneys' fees.
Summary
The adoption of the Uniform Probate Code would probably be advantageous in several respects. It would standardize the probate
laws of the various states, it would simplify the probate lawyer's task
in handling the administration of an estate, and it would reduce the
workload of overburdened state courts. The question that many lawyers have been asking, however, is whether, given the fact that the
Code would contribute to the accomplishment of these desirable results, it is the best available means for doing so.
It would appear from this survey that the adoption of the Uniform Probate Code would not significantly reduce the time and expense involved in the administration of a decedent's estate in Illinois.
As indicated above, some savings would be effected, particularly
in the areas of court costs and administrators' bonds, but as we have
seen, these expenses are only a minor portion of the total cost of probate. The major probate expenses, such as personal representatives' and attorneys' fees would probably not be significantly reduced.
In view of this, it might justifiably be asked whether the benefits
that would attend the adoption of the Uniform Probate Code in its
entirety would justify the confusion and expense that would accom130. Id. at 2.
131. Bauer, Legal Fees in Probate, 105 TRusMs & ESTATES 850 (1966). A more recent study has suggested, however, that at least in some states, attorneys' fees will be
lower under the Code than they were under prior practice. See Kinsey, supra note 79,
at 527.
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pany the abandonment of an admittedly antiquated, yet well-construed body of law in favor of a new and relatively untried one. It is
the conclusion of this author that it would not, and that the same results could be more readily achieved through the revision and modernization of existing law.
Appendix A: RESEARCH METHODS
This project was undertaken in the Fall of 1973 under the guidance of
Professor William Chamberlin, of the Northwestern University Law School.
It began with a plan to take some aspect of the Uniform Probate Code and
to compare it with the provisions of the Illinois Probate Act. After preliminary research, however, it was discovered that this had already been
comprehensively and expertly done by Mr. James Zartman, then Chairman
of the Chicago Bar Association's Subcommittee on the Uniform Probate
Code.' 32 After discussions with Mr. Zartman and with Mr. Glenn Schmidt,
another member of the Chicago Bar Association Committee, an alternative
research plan was developed.
Mr. Zartman suggested that while an informal system of probate was
thought by many to be a desirable means of avoiding the unnecessary delays and expenses of probate, there was very little data available as to what
delays and expenses were actually being experienced in practice under the
Illinois Act. It was felt that if a comprehensive review could be made of a
sampling of probate records, some basis would then be available for determining what delays and expenses are actually involved in the probate process, and to what factors these delays and expenses were attributable.
This accomplished, a comparison of the two Acts could be made in an effort to determine what economies would be effected through an adoption of
the U.P.C.
The initial plan was to examine all of the estates filed within a single
year. The year 1969 was selected because it was old enough to have included a substantial -number of closed estates and yet recent enough so that
the data collected would be relevant to current practice. A two part research approach was then developed. The first part would involve a survey of the probate court docket books, which include a record of each action taken by the court with respect to all probated estates. From these
records, dates of death, opening and closing dates, bond amounts and all
actions taken with respect to the surveyed estates were to be obtained.
The second part would consist of a review of the probate file for each
estate surveyed in the docket books. From the accountings, inventories and
other documents in these files, we hoped -to obtain information on estate
size, the amounts of disbursements and the amounts of final distributions.
The next step was to gather the relevant data. To facilitate this process,
132.
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an estate information sheet was developed on which the information from
13 3
each estate surveyed could be recorded and filed for future tabulation.
Using this information sheet, a test survey was run on 50 consecutive estates
in a 1969 docket book selected at random. The results of this preliminary
survey were twofold: -the information sheet was slightly revised to better
reflect the collected information, and the scope of the project was significantly reduced. Over 8,000 decedents' estates were probated in 1969 and
we realized that, with our limited time and resources, we could not possibly
survey all of these estates and still obtain the detailed information on each
that was desired. It was therefore decided to confine the survey to a total
of 500 estates.
The docket book used in the test survey (No. 732) was used for another
200 estates, and the result was a complete review of all of the probate
estates opened during a 2-week period in May of 1969. A random sampling of estates might have been more scientific, but it was decided that the
opening of probate estates would not be subject to pronounced seasonal
variations and that the extra time and effort in using a true random sampling
would not be required. Nevertheless, a check was made on the results by
selecting a second docket book, also at random, for the second group of
250 estates. The estates taken from this book (No. 738) were all probated during a 2-week period in November of 1969, and a cross check indicated that estates in the same size and testacy classifications were filed
in approximately the same numbers during both periods of time.
TABLE A-1
NUMBER OF ESTATES FILED IN MAY AND
NOVEMBER, 1969
Type of
Estate
Testate

Intestate

0-$20,000
May
Nov.
37
33

42

44

$20,001-$60,000
May
Nov.
41
43

15

23

$60,001 +
May
Nov.
61
42

10

10

As a result, it is felt that the 500 estates chosen are a fair representation of
all of the estates probated during 1969.
After all of the data was gathered, it was categorized and tabulated, the
arithmetic averages and median figures were computed and the results were
set forth in 16 tables which are discussed in this article.
The most significant limitation of this research is that it was confined to
records of probate estates. Thus, there is no reflection in the gross estate
figures of the existence of non-probate assets, although such assets undoubtedly had some effect on the expenses of administration. A survey
of State inheritance tax returns would have revealed the existence of most
such assets, but such a survey was beyond our capabilities, and this may
have given rise to some distortion in our results.
Another possible shortcoming is a lack of any kind of sophisticated statis133.

A copy of this form is included as Appendix B infra.

339

Loyola University Law Journal

Vol. 6: 303

tical analysis. Nevertheless, the data gives a fairly good indication of what
is going on in an area where there is not a great deal of available data.
In conclusion, the author wishes to thank the following individuals, without whose assistance this project could not have been completed.
Professor William Chamberlin; Professor of Law, Northwestern University
Law School.
Mr. Glenn Schmidt; Member of the firm of Kirkland & Ellis, Chicago, fllinois and member of the U.P.C. Subcommittee of the Chicago Bar Association.
Mr. James Zartman; Member of the firm of Chapman & Cutler, Chicago,
Illinois and Chairman of the U.P.C. Subcommittee of the Chicago Bar
Association.
Honorable Anthony Kogut; Judge of the Probate Division of the Circuit
Court of Cook County, Illinois.
The employees of the Clerk of the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois,
Probate Division, whose cooperation and assistance made a tedious
job a lot easier than it might otherwise have been.
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Appendix B: ESTATE INFORMATION SHEET

ESTATE OF
DATE OF DEATH

NO.
DATE OPENED
DATE CLOSED

CONTESTED?
TESTATE/INTESTATE
PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE
ADMIN. EXEC. A.T.C. P. ADMIN. CORP. INDIV.
CLAIMS

SALES

APPEARANCES
DIST., FEES & TAXES

OTHER

CONT.
UNC.
GROSS ESTATE
ADMIN. EXPENSES
SPOUSE'S AWARD

BOND
SURETY?
COST

TAXES
FEDERAL:
ESTATE
INCOME

STATE:
INHERITANCE
INCOME
PERS. PROP.
OTHER

FEES
ATTORNEY
EXECUTOR

OTHER EXPENSES
ESTATE DISTRIBUTED
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